Part I of this paper develops a model of economic response to inflation. Sections A, B, and C consider the maximizing behavior of employers and employees in the context of a steady rate of inflation. Since the rate of price change can be translated into an effective cost of holding money, a higher rate provides increased incentive for economizing on cash balances. Two methods of economizing are considered: first, (Sections A and B), reductions of the time interval between various types of payments (increases in "velocity") and, second (Section C), decreases in the fraction of "monetized" transactions.
that for stable-valued substitutes, such as payments in kind or foreign exchange). If this inflationary cost is weighed against money's transactions benefits, the fraction of expenditures for which it pays to retain money is inversely related to the rate of price change. The combination of this money-substitute effect with the previously described velocity mechanism produces an increasing (absolute) elasticity of money demand to the rate of inflation.
The analysis of Sections A, B, and C assumes a constant rate of price change. Section D extends the analysis to consider the optimal response to rates of inflation which vary over time. Basically, if no costs of adjustment or lags in perception are involved, the steady-state solution would be optimal at all times. Accordingly, if lags in perception are neglected, the optimal response to changing rates of inflation involves a weighing of adjustment costs (for example, costs of instituting changes in the payments period) against "out-of-equilibrium" costs (that is, costs of not adhering to the steady-state rules at all times). The model of Section D assumes that actual rates of price change are generated by a symmetric, stochastic process (a random walk), and that individuals adopt an adjustment policy of the (S, s) inventory form. According to this type of policy, variations in the inflation rate produce no response (in, say, the payments period or the fraction of monetized transactions) until some critical gap between actual and statically optimal levels appears. At this point some discrete adjustment of decision variables is performed in accordance with the optimal steady-state relationships. No subsequent adjustments occur until a new gap of the critical size appears, The (S, s) response model is used to obtain an aggregate mechanism for generating "effective" rates of inflation (the rate which is relevant for key decision variables, and, therefore, for demand for money). The mechanism is similar in form to earlier models of the adaptive-expectations type (Cagan 1956 ), although the current model reflects solely an adjustment lag. A key implication of maximizing behavior is the dependence of the response coefficient on the (effective) rate of inflation itself.
The theory of Part I is applied in Part II to an empirical study of demand for money. The data derive from four cases of post-World War I hyperinflation (Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Poland), which were previously studied by Cagan (1956) and Allais (1966) . Substantial space is devoted to constructing null hypotheses which embody the theoretical implications of Part I. Basically, these null hypotheses involve a priori conjectures on the coefficients of regression equations. The (nonlinear, iterative) empirical estimation and testing confirms the bulk of these conjectures, and, therefore, provides support for the underlying theory. Comments on the statistical results and avenues for future research are indicated at the end of the paper.
A Model of the Payments Period and the Demand for Money

A. The Basic Steady-State Model
The model is developed with reference to a business firm, which is subsequently viewed as an employer. Assume that prices in an economy are rising uniformly at a continuous rate, rp, so that:
where, PO is the price level at time zero. A firm (for example, a store) is receiving a continuously rising stream of money income given by:
where, YO is the income level at time zero.
Money income is assumed to be rising at the same rate, rp, as prices, so that real income is constant. The firm's alternative to retaining its income flow as cash (which is depreciating in value at the rate of inflation, rp) is to hold some alternative stable-valued asset, such as physical commodities or foreign exchange (it is assumed for simplicity that real interest bearing assets are unavailable). However, there is some cost or bother associated with the conversion of cash into a stable-valued asset, so that transfers are not made continuously. That is, the firm accumulates money over a period and converts a lump amount to an alternative asset at some transfer date. The nature of the relevant transfer cost is complex, since it may involve personal bother or waste of time, wage payments to employees, actual brokerage charges for foreign exchange or other financial transactions, et cetera. In general the cost involves some elements which are related to the price level and others which are of an income-forgone nature.' However, when prices and income grow at the same rate, it is expected that the money value of the transfer cost also grows at this rate. Accordingly, if a(t) represents the money cost of transfers at time t (regarded for simplicity as being independent of the amount transferred), we have:
where ao is the money cost at time zero. The presence of interest and transfer-cost elements produces a tradeoff which amounts to an optimization problem for the firm. A general formulation of the problem is the following: Given that a transfer from cash to stable asset was made at some time to, choose the future transfer dates, t1, t2, . . . so as to achieve an optimal tradeoff between the interest cost of holding cash and the transfer cost of making more frequent asset conversions.
Mathematically, the optimization -is as follows: After the transfer at time to, consider the interval (to, t1) where t1 is the first optional transfer date. In a time differential, dt, the increment to money holding is given by dM = Ydt = Yoerptdt. Therefore, the addition to interest cost (in terms of "t1-money") is given by: 
The total interest cost up to the nth transfer date, tn, is the sum of n terms of the form of equation ( 
The nominal amount of transfer cost for any interval, (tk, tk + 1), is aoerptk + 1 so that the discounted cost is ao. Therefore, the total discounted transfer cost for the interval, (to, t), is given by:
A*(to, tn) = aon.
The total discounted cost, ZT, for the interval (to, tn), is given by the sum of equations (6) and ( 
The optimization problem can be formulated as follows. Given a time interval, T= t,to, with the constraint that the final transfer be made at time tn, choose n and t1, t2,.. ., tn1 so that Z* is a minimum. A necessary condition for a minimum is aZ*/t_-0 for k = 1,..., n-1.
Therefore, Y,(erptk -1 erptk + erptk +1 erptk) -0. Rearranging terms, we have e2rptk-erp(tk 1-+ tk ) Therefore: tk 2= I (tkl + tk+1) fork = 1,..n -1.
In other words, the optimal transfer points are evenly spaced when prices, income, and transfer costs grow at the same rate.2
The result in equation (9) implies that equation (8) can be simplified to:
where use has been made of the conditions (ttk +) =-Tn, and (tnto) = T. The minimization problem then reduces to choosing n, the number of transfers in time T, so that (10) is a minimum. Accordingly,3
An - If real income is not constant, a sufficient condition for equally spaced transfers is that money income and transfer cost grow at the same rate. (This result is valid even if some nonzero real rate of discount is appropriate. In this case the opportunity cost of holding money is r = r* + rp, where r* is the real rate of discount and r, is the rate of price change.) Stated somewhat differently, as long as transfer costs are completely of an income-forgone nature, the optimal transfer points are equally spaced.
3 At first sight, the treatment of n (number of transfers in time T) as a continuous variable is suspect. However, the selection of n in this manner amounts to a choice of Tin (time between payments), which can properly be regarded as continuous. The optimization runs into some trouble if T is retained as a finite horizon (amounting to the constraint that an integral number of transfers must occur in a specified length of time, such as a week or a month), in which case the calculus solution must be regarded as an approximation. However, the nature of the objective function guarantees that the true optimum will be close, in the sense that an integer adjacent to the calculus result will be the optimal value. (That is, the second derivative of the cost expression in equation [10] is (02ZT)/(1n2) = Ye-rPTIn (r,/n)(T/n)2, which is positive when r, is positive. Therefore, the objective function is "single troughed," and an integer adjacent to the calculus solution is the optimal value.) If r,(T/n) << 1, we may approximate a/ Yo {r,(T/n)2. Therefore: T V1(2a0)/(rpYo).
(12) n Corresponding to this solution, rT/n = V1(2aor,)/ YO, which will be much less than 1 for conceivable values of a,, rp, and YO, so that the exponential approximation is appropriate. The second-order condition is also satisfied, so that the solution of equation (12) corresponds to a minimum for 7* .
Applying the exponential approximation, epTn r 1 -rET/n + 2 (rpT/n)2, directly to equation (10), we obtain for later use an expression (dependent on T/n) for total (discounted) employer cost over time T: Zemployer 2 rY,(Tln)T + (a01P0) n.
The first term in this expression amounts to the interest cost over time T on the employer's average money balance:
(M/P) employer 2 P -2 P _.
Therefore, the determination of T/n in equation (12) implies an employer average money demand in the form of equation (14). Since the solution for T/n in equation (12) is modified by a consideration of employee behavior, this implied demand-for-money function is not discussed at this point.
B. The Payments Period
Equation (12) indicates the optimal time spacing for conversions of employer cash holdings to alternative stable-valued assets, such as commodities and foreign exchange, on the assumption that these assets represent an ultimate destination for employer funds. In fact, a substantial fraction of employer income is destined for wage payments to employees (or other types of payments), so that the indirect route, cash to stable asset (to cash) to payments, may be nonoptimal. That is, if wage payments (or other payments) are regarded by the employer as fixed in real terms, the rendering of these payments is (from the employer standpoint) equivalent to the transfer of cash to a stable-valued asset. In other words, if a(t) in equation (3) is reinterpreted as the cost of making wage payments, and if the rendering of these payments is substituted for the conversion of cash to a stable-valued asset, then the model will (with the qualifications noted below) describe the determination of the payments period during inflation.
From the employer standpoint, the interpretation of the time interval of equation (12) as a payments period assumes that the indirect route, cash to stable asset to payments, will not be used. Whether, in fact, an asset would be considered for this type of intermediate function depends on the cost of moving in and out of the asset, and the real rate of return that accrues on it. In particular, an asset will be used only if the transfer cost is small relative to the cost of making wage payments, and/or the real rate of return is substantial. One possible type of satisfactory asset is a stable-valued (or real interest bearing) deposit or short-term bill.
At least during extreme inflationary experiences, the available assets do not conform well to the conditions suggested above.4 Rather, the available assets appear to serve two other types of functions. First, there are assets whose transactions-cost and return characteristics make them suitable as a long-term store of wealth, but not as a temporary abode for funds earmarked for payments over the relatively short term.5 This class includes real investment opportunities, accumulation of types of physical commodities, and so forth.
The second category consists of assets which themselves acquire meansof-payments properties during extreme inflation. When a sufficiently high rate of inflation is attained, it becomes worthwhile to use certain substitute transactions media (such as foreign exchange, private tokens, and certain commodities) in order to avoid the costs associated with the use of the depreciating currency. However, while the existence of such money substitutes has a substantial impact on the demand for money, the effect does not operate via the intermediary mechanism described above. That is, as long as the usual money supply is retained for receipts and payments, these types of assets do not enter the analysis.6 A discussion of these assets as substitute means of payments is contained in Section C below. For the remainder of this section, it is assumed that the usual money supply is retained for all transactions purposes, and that no satisfactory intermediate assets exist.7 A more serious qualification to the interpretation of equation (12) as a I In a complete model, the types of available assets would themselves be endogenous. However, the absence of "short-term," real interest bearing assets during extreme inflations seems to reflect the uncertainty of the inflationary course, rather than the intensity, per se. Since the introduction of uncertainty does not seem critical for the prime areas of interest of the steady-state model, it seems desirable to maintain the assumption of certainty and to regard the types of available assets as exogenous. 5 It is assumed implicitly that the payments period will not exceed some relatively short time interval. This constraint derives from the employee behavior (discussed below), which serves to make an overly long period unprofitable to the employer. 6 Essentially, if these assets could serve as a profitable intermediate asset, they could more profitably serve as a complete means-of-payments substitute. 7 The impact of stable-valued, readily accessible intermediate assets is discussed below in n. 17. payments period involves the behavior of employees. The original presentation of the model (with the substitution of wage payments for transfers to stable-valued assets) tacitly assumes that employees are indifferent to the length of the payments period, and are concerned only with the (apparent) real wage rate. In fact, increases in the period impose certain costs on employees, which must be weighed in determining the optimal length of time between payments.8
The first type of employee cost derives from the delay in real payment implied by a lengthened payments period.9 The second cost involves the relationship between the payments period and average employee money holdings.
The cost imputed to delayed real wage payment depends on the use of these payments. If delayed payment implies a reduction in employee savings, the (real) lending rate is relevant. If the delay results in increased borrowings, the (real) borrowing rate is appropriate. In many cases (particularly during extreme inflation, when financial markets are highly imperfect) neither borrowing nor lending is involved, and the impact is directly on postponed consumption.10 That is, if (real) lending rates are low and (real) borrowing rates are high, an intermediate marginal impatience rate is most likely to apply. In any case, there exists some (real) rate r* (not necessarily identical for all individuals)1 at which payment delays are discounted.12 8 See Friedman 1956, p. 13. It is assumed that wage payments are made subsequent to the rendering of services. This assumption is discussed below in n. 12.
10 Behavior in markets where borrowing and lending rates differ is discussed in Hirshleifer 1958. 11 The discount rate may not be independent of TIn (delays need not be discounted linearly), but this complication is neglected here. 12 The question of advanced versus deferred wage payments (see n. 9) can be treated as follows. Let rB denote the real employee borrowing rate (and also the rate at which employers are willing to lend to employees); r* the marginal impatience rate of employees (which is assumed to equal the rate at which employees are willing to lend to employers-that is, lending to employers is viewed as a riskless investment by employees); and rL the real rate of return (or riskless lending rate) on employer (and employee) wealth holdings, where rB ? r* > rL. It is assumed that the employer borrowing rate (and, therefore, also the employer marginal impatience rate) is approximately equal to rL, so that /'L unambiguously represents the marginal rate of return on employer funds. Therefore, in this view the essential distinction between employees and employers is the relative position of borrowing rates.
Assume that the (real) amount X/P is paid from employers to employees at some nonzero payment interval. An advance of wages amounts to a loan (of the average quantity, [1/2]1[X/P]), from employers to employees while a deferral implies a loan in the opposite direction. An advance (employer to employee loan) is valued by employers at the rate -B, and by employees at the rate r*. The net (nonpositive) rate of return associated with advance payment is therefore -B + r*. Similarly, the rate of return on deferrals (employee to employer loans) is -r* + rL. Therefore, advances and deferrals both involve nonpositive rates of return in comparison with the zero rate of return attached to perfect synchronization of payments (abstracting from transactions costs). Given that payments are not to be perfectly synchronized If the nominal wage rate is denoted by w, the amount of nominal wage payment (for a period, T/n) is given by X = avi(T/n).13 Consider the interval between the payments points, to and t1. At t1, employees receive a quantity of real wage payment, X/P = w/P(T/n), in payment for services between to and t1. Assuming that employees conduct expenditures at a uniform rate and just exhaust a single wage payment over the time interval, Tln, the average deferred time between wage accruals and employee expenditure is Tin. The cost of this delay for a single payments period (ignoring compounding during the short interval, T/n)'4 is r*(X/P)T/n = r*(w/P) (T/n)2. The cost for n periods (that is, for a time T) is therefore: Zr* = r*(w/P)(T/n)T.
The average employee real money balance (assuming the absence of intermediate assets) can be approximated by:
The corresponding employee interest cost (that is, the inflationary loss on money holdings, neglecting compounding, over the time T) is given by: 
Expression (18), above, may overstate employee costs, since it excludes any deviation of expenditures from a uniform flow. In fact, as inflation intensifies, employees are (ceteris paribus) motivated to concentrate (because of transactions costs), the optimal payments scheme is the one with the least negative rate of return. (As in the rest of the analysis, concern is only with obtaining a "Pareto-optimal type" solution, and is not with the division of costs and benefits between employers and employees. See n. 15 below.) Therefore, deferred payment is preferred to advanced payment if and only if: (r* --rL) < (rBr*). (It should be noted that, at least as long as r* is independent of the length of delays, any intermediate payments solution corresponds to a weighted average of the two extreme rates of return, and is therefore inferior to one of the extreme solutions, unless these are themselves equivalent.) Since the model assumes that payments are deferred, the appropriate (real) discount rate for payments delays is (r* -rL); (rL = 0 has also been assumed). In general the discount rate can be written as: min [(rB -r*);
(r* -rL)]. 13 It is assumed that employment-numbers of man-hours worked per weekdoes not change. In this case, Tln is an acceptable proxy for total man-hours worked. 14 This and subsequent approximations which ignore compounding are formally equivalent to the infinite series approximation involved in the derivation of equation (12). The validity of the approximation depends throughout on (rQ + r*)(Tln) << 1. expenditures closer to payment times in order to reduce money holdings and incur smaller losses from inflation. However, a preliminary model of this behavior suggests that the general relationship between average money holdings and the rate of inflation is not materially altered by a consideration of this motive. This conclusion is further supported by the observation that, while employees desire to concentrate expenditures shortly after wage payments, employers have a symmetric desire to concentrate expenditures just before payments. The balancing of these forces could generate a "weekly seasonal" of rate of price change that would discourage the concentration of expenditures either just after or just before wage payments, and tend to restore the system to a uniform pattern of expenditure. In any case, the assumption of uniform patterns is retained in the body of this paper.
With the assumption of uniform expenditure streams, total real costs over time T (the sum of employer and employee costs) are given (from equations [13] and [18]) by:
Ztotal T{[ (2 + -)rp + r*] + T} (19)
The optimal-payments period is that value of Tln which minimizes this total cost expression.15 Accordingly, we have: The second-order minimum condition is satisfied for this solution. 15 This cost minimization guarantees a Pareto-optimal situation with respect to employers and employees. For example, if employees were willing to pay some amount (in the form, say, of a reduced explicit wage) for a reduction in the payments period, and employers were willing to accept some lesser amount as compensation for this reduction, it is assumed that the reduction of the payments period takes place.
The division of costs and benefits between employers and employees is not discussed explicitly-largely because it does not seem necessary for the desired results. 16 In effect, Y corresponds to the total money flow into a business and w to the total money flow out of a business. (That is, w comprises rentals, payments to other businesses, net earnings, et cetera, as well as payments to labor-although the real discount rate, r*, may depend on the particular form of payment.) Therefore, systematic deviations between YIP and w1P can occur only through intermediate inflationary losses. This loss relates to the cost of inflation (equations [19] and [22]) and
increases with (r, + r*)l/2. However, as long as r, is less than astronomical, this cost remains small relative to YIP, so that the approximation YIPwlp should be sustainable. 17 The payments-period relationship, equation (21), can be readily extended to the case where satisfactory intermediate assets exist (see previous discussion). In one 
While it is possible to discuss only orders of magnitude, it is interesting to explore the relationship between the payments period and the rate of inflation implied by equation (21). For example, taking parameter values of Y = $400 per month, a = $1.00 (only the ratio a! Y is of importance in equation [21]), and r* = .01 per month, the relationship as shown in table 1 holds.
While the exact relationship depends on the arbitrary specification of parameters, the overall magnitudes accord with observations from some extreme inflationary experiences.18 An interesting implication of the above plausible situation, employers have available (at a transfer cost which, in the overall cost calculation, is low enough to make the asset worthwhile) an alternative asset with (riskless) real rate of return, rL, and employees have available no satisfactory alternative asset. In this case the real rate of return on employer money holdings is changed fromr, to rL, and the remainder of the model is unchanged. Therefore, (r, + r*) in equation (21) is replaced by (r* -r --rL) to yield the new optimal payments period. If employees have access to a similar satisfactory asset, (r, + r*) in equation (21) is replaced by (r* -rL). In this case, the determination of a finite payments period requires the real discount rate of employees (r*) to exceed the underlying (riskless) real rate of return (rL).
It should be noted that the decision to employ an alternative asset involves a weighing of the rate of return against the cost of transactions relative to the volume of transactions. Therefore, considering their larger scale of transactions, employers are more likely than employees to find a particular asset (with given rate of return and transactions-cost characteristics) satisfactory, so that the first case (with rate: r* + Ir, -IrL) may be the most realistic-at least for developed countries like the 
relation between real cash balances and the inflation rate (equations [24]
and [25]). The mechanism by which cash holdings were reduced in response to a higher rate of inflation involved the reduction of the time period between transactions (that is, an increase in velocity). An additional mechanism by which cash holdings could be reduced involves the substitution of some alternative asset (foreign exchange, private tokens, payments in kind, and so on) as a transactions medium. By reducing the set of transactions to which money is applied, average cash holdings can be reduced, even if transaction periods (velocity) remain constant.
Letting 5P(r,) denote the fraction of transactions (as a function of the inflation rate) which are conducted via some substitute medium, and assuming that the analysis of Sections A and B applies to the 100(1 -) percent of transactions for which money is retained, we have from equation (25) Once the percentage of monetized transactions (1 -$) is regarded as a behaviorally determined magnitude, it is necessary to construct an explicit cost-benefit framework for determining the mode which payments take. If money is used for a volume of transactions corresponding to 21 It should be recalled that variations in the shape of expenditure streams have been ruled out. However, this type of variation does not appear to be a potential source of an increasing inflation-rate elasticity.
YIP, the inflationary cost per unit of time is (from equation [22], using A = -V[a1P]1[Y1P]):
If a stable-valued asset is substituted as the transactions medium, the above cost could be avoided. Therefore, the decision to employ money or the substitute involves a comparison of the inflationary cost (equation [28]) with the benefits of money as a transactions medium (in terms of physical convenience, general acceptability, et cetera). The size of this benefit cannot be readily quantified, since it depends on the type of transaction and the individuals involved. For example, the benefit is likely to increase as one moves along the following list: (1) transactions within a family, (2) regular dealings with a local merchant, (3) dealings in new locations, (4) payments by mail, (5) dealings in securities markets. In any case, it seems feasible to group transactions into homogeneous classes, within which the benefit per amount of transaction is constant. That is, for the ith group of transactions, the benefit (per unit of time) of employing money is: 23 By adopting the boundary condition (D(r, = 0) = 0, we ignore the possible use of money substitutes when r, < 0. Actually, a positive rate of return on money holdings (r, < 0) may be required in order to induce certain nonmonetary sectors of the economy (especially prevalent in underdeveloped countries) to employ the conventional money supply. 24 The situation with r, < r* is unstable because the real rate of return on money holdings (-r,) exceeds the marginal impatience rate, r*. The stability properties of the system will be discussed in a later paper. 25 The percentage of money-substitute transactions, as a function of the rate of inflation, is illustrated in the table below. Parameter values of k = 1.25 (months 1/2) (the empirical estimate for Germany) and r* = .01 per month have been used. Therefore, the (absolute) elasticity increases with r, beyond I, with the rate of increase depending on k. While the precise form of equation (36) hinges on the assumed distributions of (T/P)i and (Y/P)i, the general behavior depends only on an increasing tendency to adopt substitutes as rp rises, and has already been described in equation (27).
In equation (35), which assumes that transactions costs, aIP, rise proportionately with Y/P, the elasticity of real cash balances with respect to real income is constant at + 1.0. If transactions costs rise less than in proportion to YIP, the elasticity is reduced and "economies-of-scale" in cash balances are realized. If transactions costs rise more than in proportion to YIP, the elasticity exceeds + 1.0 and money is a "luxury. In the general case we require behavioral assumptions that go beyond the steady-state model.
The statement that (M/P)l is related to ,e in the form of equation (37) amounts to the statement that 7te determines such fundamental decision variables as the payments period and the percentage of money substitutes in a manner which leads to the prescribed form for money demand. Accordingly, T/n (for those transactions which retain the conventional money supply) is given from equation (21) Presumably, values of (T/n)t and 4t (with implied values of 7t) are chosen over time so as to minimize some conception of inflationary costs. In attempting to quantify these costs below, we neglect the influence of money substitutes (take k 0) in order to keep the algebra manageable.28
Assume that the actual rate of price change, ITt, prevails over some time interval, T. The cost associated with maintaining an effective rate, transactions in which the benefits of money as a payments medium are high (T/P increases as YIP increases-though this is likely to contradict the previous simplifying assumption that [F/P]i and [Y/P]i are independently distributed). In this case the income elasticity is raised, and money is more likely to emerge as a luxury. 27 It is assumed that the same 7, value is appropriate for Tin, D, and any other decision variables that are relevant for (M/P)D. 28 Essentially, we concentrate on the payments period as a decision variable, and therefore restrict attention to individuals who retain the conventional money supply. As far as relative shifts in and out of substitutes (changes in 0) differ from relative shifts in the payments period, some error will be introduced in the generation of 7e* The error is likely to be small for small values of qD (see n. 24), and may become important as 1D becomes large. However, the direction of error is not immediately clear, and further analysis would be required to ascertain it. Presumably, if rt were perceived instantaneously, and 7Te (that is, Tin and other implied decision variables) could be adjusted costlessly with a zero time lag, we would always have e = vt. Assuming that the lag in perception of Tt can be neglected, the essential characteristic for the existence of 7t # vt is a nonzero cost associated with changes in ve (that is, question involves, in particular, the behavior of the rate of change of the money supply. Because the random-walk process is nonstationary, it is unlikely to provide a realistic long-run description of the rate of price change or of the rate of change of the money supply. Nevertheless, the process may provide a useful basis for short-run analysis of individual adjustment behavior. In any case the important assumptions seem to be: (1) a fixed perception interval, r, (2) the symmetric nature of the walk, and (3) serial independence. The second assumption reflects a (long-run) neutral stance toward acceleration or deceleration of prices, and appears to be reasonable. The third assumption (which rules out extrapolations of the recent mt trend) is more questionable. Serial dependence would affect the form, though not the general nature, of the results. The first assumption is critical for the model, and reflects a segment of behavior that has not been considered at all. Essentially, the random-walk process regards any observed value of ITt as the best estimate of future 7T values. Accordingly, no distinction is made between expected and actual rates of inflation, and the explanation for rt4 # 7t derives solely from costs of adjustment of we. As the perception interval (r) tends to zero, the model implies that each instantaneous value of (I/p)(dp)/(dt) is, by itself, the best estimate of future -t's. Maintaining a finite value of r substitutes an average value of (l/p)(dp)/(dt) for an instantaneous value, but does not change the fundamental problem. A complete model would consider both expectational and adjustment factors in the formation of the effective rate (ITe), and would remove the ad hoc perception interval that was necessitated by the lack of an expectations mechanism. 30 This is a slight approximation, based on the discussion in n. 34 below. Therefore, E(Ex)2 h2/6. 32 Feller 1968, p. 349. In Feller's model, the barriers are at 0 and a, with an intermediate starting point at z; while in our model, the barriers are at + h, with a starting point of 0. However, Feller's results are readily adaptable to our case.
Substituting for Tin from equation (38) (with A [a/P]/[YIP]) we
Using the four boundary conditions to evaluate the constants, the solution is
The above expression measures the expected amount of time between contacts with the upper or lower barrier (that is, between adjustments of 1e). The expected number of contacts (adjustments) per unit of time can be approximated by 1/D (see Miller and Orr 1966, p. 421).
Letting m denote the number of contacts in time T, we have:
As suggested above, the higher h, the lower the (expected) number of  adjustments per time, and the lower the associated (expected) Cagan, pp. 58-64 ). The current model provides a theoretically derived mechanism of this type, which is used for an empirical study in the second part of this paper.
II. Empirical Results on Demand for Money during Hyperinflations
The theoretical model of demand for money has been applied to data on four post-World War I hyperinflations (Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland) previously studied by Cagan (1956) 97-114 ). The type of information that Cagan considers can be used to construct rough employment indices for the four cases. These indices are contained in the Appendix tables. Considering the coverage and accuracy of the basic data, the indices seem fairly reliable (as a general indicator) for Austria and Germany, less reliable for Poland, and mostly unreliable for Hungary. The overall indication is that variations in real income were small relative to changes in the inflation rate, so that taking Y/P constant may be satisfactory (though this conclusion is especially questionable for Hungary and uncertain for Poland). Because of the crude nature of the employment data, the addition of real income to the regression equations has not been attempted.
In general, the real rate of discount (r*) should be somewhat above the (riskless) real rate of return in an economy. Average real rates of return during the hyperinflations were apparently small and possibly negative. Accordingly, we expect values of r* near zero, and, in any case, negligible in comparison with the inflation-rate variable (ire). Therefore, we have set r* = 0 and have not attempted to estimate r* from the data. 36 Three cases from Cagan's original seven have been excluded: post-World War I Russia and World War II Greece and Hungary. The Russian case was excluded because the assumption of constant real income appeared unreasonable and adequate income data was unavailable. The money-supply data for Greece was unreliable (Cagan, p. 106), and the variation in real income during the war was apparently substantial (International Labor Review, December 1945, p. 650 ). The available data for Hungary covers too brief a period to provide a useful test of the model.
The possible error involved with taking M/PD = M/P is not explicitly considered in this paper.
The effective rate of inflation (7Te) in equations (74) and (75) is assumed to be generated by the mechanism of equation ( The coefficients to be estimated for each case are a1, a2, k, and b. The method of estimation is a nonlinear iterative routine for minimizing the sum of squared residuals in each regression. This procedure corresponds to maximum likelihood estimation if the error disturbances (Ut) are independently and normally distributed.38 Since the primary objective is to test the theory, we list the a priori conjectures on each coefficient:
a 1 = log (A Y/P): Without information on real income levels, this coefficient depends on arbitrary index levels, and cannot be tested.
2. a2 = -0.5: This point value is the strongest a priori information to be tested.
3. k: This parameter determines the percentage of money substitutes (4)) as a function of 7Te (equation [75] ). The higher k, the larger the percentage of substitutes and the smaller the demand for money at a given value of ire: k = 4A/(F/P) = 4Va/ Y/Q(T/P) (see Section IC), where a! Y is the ratio of transactions cost to transactions volume and T/P is the average cost of employing money substitutes (per amount of transaction). To obtain some notion of the order of magnitude of k, we assume (taking time units of months), 0.5/400 < alY < 2.0/400, .10 <_ T/P < .20. Correspondingly, the limiting values of kare 0.7 < k < 2.8 (months1/2).
Negative values of -7T were set equal to zero in order to obtain Virt in equation (77). In fact, few negative values occurred so that no major adjustment was required. Nevertheless, the necessity for this adjustment reflects an incompleteness in the generation mechanism for ,e, which may stem from the lack of an expectations mechanism (see n. 29). 38 See Cagan, pp. 93-94. One problem with the estimation is that Pt influences both sides of the equation. This problem is not serious when Pt << 1, but may become important for the most extreme observations. Unfortunately, obtaining a reduced form equation does not seem possible.
Obviously, this limit is both wide and arbitrary, but k > 0 is a fundamental implication of the theory: k = 0 (an infinite cost for money substitutes) corresponds to a constant inflation-rate elasticity, while k > 0 corresponds to an increasing (absolute) elasticity. The model is supported if k = 0 can be rejected in favor of k > 0.
The k parameter may also be viewed in terms of its variation among different cases. The theory suggests (for given values of a! Y) that k is larger the smaller the value of T/P. Therefore, higher k values correspond to situations where money substitutes are more readily available (that is, less costly). However, there is little a priori basis for determining relative T/P values among the cases studied, so that equality among the k values forms the basic null hypothesis. 4. b: This coefficient determines the speed with which effective rates of inflation (,e) respond to actual rates (ir) (equation [77] ). A priori, we expect b > 0 and approximately equal for each case: b = 0 implies that 7e does not respond at all to changes in ir, therefore, b = 0 should be rejectable in favor of b > 0. Order-of-magnitude notions of b were not derived.
The a priori conjectures on the coefficients are tested by means of the likelihood ratio (A). The asymptotic x2 distribution of -2 1oge A is utilized to construct 95 percent confidence intervals for each coefficient.39 These intervals can then be used to construct acceptance regions for two-sided (5 percent) tests of the a priori conjectures on each coefficient.40 The tests were applied independently for each coefficient in order to obtain separate conclusions on each conjecture. While these tests depend on asymptotic distribution theory and are not actually independent, the greatest hedge on their validity seems to be the assumed serial independence of the errors.
The likelihood ratio was also used to test the joint null hypothesis, a2 = -0.5, for the four cases combined, and to test the null hypothesis of equality for a,2, k, and b coefficients among the different cases.
The An overall test of equality among the four a2 values involves the likelihood ratio with 3 df, based on the overall estimate of a2 (-.515).42 The relevant statistic is -2 loge A = 5.42, which is less than X2(3).o5 = 7.82, so that the null hypothesis of equality among the a2'S is accepted at the .05 level.
The overall hypothesis, a2 = -0.5, can be tested by constraining a2 = -0.5 in each case. The resulting statistic is: -2 loge A = 7.40, which is less than X2(4).o5 = 9.49. Therefore, the overall null hypothesis a2 = -0.5, is accepted at the .05 level.
Because of the restrictive nature of the null hypothesis (a2 = -0.5, a point value) the empirical results for the a2 coefficients provide strong support for the underlying theory. k estimates.-The point estimates of k are, in each case, positive and within the a priori interval, 0.7 < k < 2.8. Therefore, the null hypothesis that each k lies within this interval is accepted. The null hypothesis, k = 0, is rejected at the 5 percent level in favor of k > 0 for Austria, 41 The weighting scheme follows from the usual treatment of heteroscedastic disturbances. Let (SLE), = V(S9E/T)j denote the estimated standard error of the residuals from the unconstrained regression for the ith case. In performing an overall regression, the observations for the ith case are weighted by l/SEEj = V/T/SSEj. Therefore, we wish to minimize the overall weighted sum of squared residuals: 4 SSE* Tt t where SSE* is the (restricted) sum of squared residuals for the ith case in the overall regression, and the summation is over the (four) cases in the sample. 42 Based on the weighting scheme of n. 41 above, and the likelihood-ratio distribution discussed in n. 39 above, we have: 4 _Ti{ioge[ 2 Tt(S E]SSEi)} Germany, and Poland, but must be accepted for Hungary. Therefore, three of the four cases considered substantiate an increasing inflation-rate elasticity, as was suggested by the money-substitute section of the theory.
The null hypothesis of equality among k values for the four cases corresponds to a statistic: -2 loge A 5.19, which is less than X2(3).o5 = 7.82. Therefore, equality among the k's is accepted at the .05 level. The implication is that no significant divergence existed in the availability of money substitutes among the four cases considered. b estimates.-The point estimates are positive in each case, and significantly greater than zero. The null hypothesis of equality among the four cases corresponds to a statistic: -2 loge A 9.22, which is greater than x2(3). = 7.82 (though less than X2(3).02 = 9.84). Therefore, equality among the b coefficients is rejected at the .05 level. Observation of the individual confidence intervals suggests that the chief "cause" of rejection is the low b estimate for Austria, relative to those for Germany and Poland. Since there are no obvious theoretical grounds for divergence among b values, this result may be symptomatic of some flaw in the mechanism by which 7re is generated.
The Overall Fit and Comparison with Cagan's Results
In general the regression fits for Austria, Germany, and Poland (in terms of standard error of estimate [SEE]) are "good," and apparently quite similar.43 The average errors for Hungary appear to be significantly higher than those for the other three cases.
Some perspective on the fit may be gained by a comparison with Cagan's results. Table 3 
Autocorrelation of Residuals
A major cause of concern in the empirical results (table 2) is the generally low Durbin-Watson statistic, which indicates positive serial correlation of residuals for Hungary and Poland, and possible positive correlation for Germany. Only in the Austrian case can serial correlation be ruled out.45 In principle, serial correlation does not produce inconsistency in point estimates, although it does reduce efficiency. The impact on statistical tests is likely to be more serious since the underlying distribution theory requires serially independent errors. One approach to the problem involves the explicit specification of a residual process which exhibits serial correlation (for example, a first-order Markov process). However, since the presence of serial correlation is likely to be an indicator of some sort of misspecification, the best remedy is a fuller specification of the model. This attempt at fuller specification constitutes a useful area for future research. At this point it is clear that the statistical results for Austria and Germany are considerably more reliable than those for Hungary and Poland. Despite the problem of serial correlation, it seems clear that the empirical results provide considerable support for the theory developed in Part I. tion of the effective rate of inflation mechanism, possibly involving the introduction of an expectations mechanism; (c) reconsideration of the assumption of continuous equilibrium between actual and desired money balances.
III. Extensions of the Model
The theoretical results will be extended to a consideration of inflationary finance and the welfare cost of inflation.
The model will be applied to an empirical study of the inflationary experiences in Latin America and in other countries. Nachrichten, 1923, p. 195 UN Demographic Yearbook) . The unemployment percentage is assumed to be 6.5 percent in January 1924 (International Labour Review, September 1925, p. 349), and the index is calculated by the method described above for Austria. Values in parentheses have been obtained by interpolation. , 1920-21, vol. 2, no. 12, p. 18, and later issues) . Published figures under this heading for months prior to November 1921 actually refer to wholesale prices. From November 1923 the data relates to the second half of the month, and has been interpolated to the middle of the month (Monthly Bulletin, 1923, vol. 4, no. 11, p. 3) . Prior to November 1921, retail price indices are apparently unavailable, and an index of wholesale prices has been used (International Labour Review, October 1921, p. 77). The employment index is based on numbers of unemployed (Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich, 1924/25, international table 13), and on interpolated population figures (UN Demographic Yearbook). The percentage of unemployed on September 1923 is assumed to be 3 percent, and the index is calculated by the method described above for Austria.
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